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 to protect every inventory of radioactive, toxic or hazardous material:
 to prevent mobilisation into rooms where personnel could be exposed,
 to prevent release to the environment that could lead to public exposure.
 to meet DEMO general safety objectives in compliance with the environment
in operational / accidental situation,
 to reduce potential impacts to the extent reasonably practicable.
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Conclusion
 Based on the DEMO main systems identified with the confinement function, a confinement strategy has been proposed: two
confinement systems and three associated barriers during normal operation, and two barriers in maintenance.
 The main safety systems and devices have been proposed.
 Not all source terms are covered by both active and passive barriers. More passive safety systems are required.
 Identify the confinement function for the sub-systems & components accompanying the development of PBS levels in future.
 Open issues: source inventories, provision of the He EV, discharge of the huge amount of magnet energy in accident scenarios,
leak conditions, wall & composite liner options for the tokamak building taking into account cost implications, additional
passive / active methods , maintain confinement for different plant states (cold and hot standby, maintenance).
Following the European roadmap to the realisation of fusion energy, a
demonstration fusion power plant (DEMO) is currently in pre-conceptual design
phase until 2020. In this context an external stakeholder group formulated a
nuclear licensed manufacturing and construction (M/C) mission statement as the
top level requirement for a DEMO, translating essentially to the confinement of
radioactive and hazardous materials as the most fundamental safety function in
normal, abnormal and accidental situations. Taking a bottom-up approach at
system level, the confinement function is identified for the main systems at the
PBS level 1. Consequently, a confinement strategy has been proposed.
 Energy
 In operation: enthalpy in structure and coolant, plasma thermal energy,
magnetic energy, disruption mechanical energy
 Decay heat after the plasma shutdown
 Energy from exothermal chemical reactions (W/Be/PbLi - air/steam), dust
explosion, overpressure scenarios, spills of cryogenic or hot He into the VV
and containment, etc.;
 Energy release due to postulated H2 explosion
 Radioactive sources
 Tritium in different facility regions (VV, PHTS, fuel cycles)
 Dust in the VV
 Activated corrosion products (ACPs)
 Neutron sputtering products
 Activated materials
 Radioactive isotopes from noble gases (Ne or Ar) used for plasma seeding
 N2 seeding for ELM mitigation, N2 impurity in structure, injected N2 to avoid
H2 explosion.
 Internal hazards
 Internal fire, explosion, flooding
 Thermal releases
 Plasma transients / disruption
 Missile effects and pipe whip
 Loss of vacuum, coolant, heat sink, cryogenics
 Mechanical , chemical and toxic, magnetic and electromagnetic risks
 External hazards
 Natural environment (earthquakes, extreme climatic conditions, flooding, fire)
 Human activities (air crash, station blackout, etc.)
 First confinement system
 First barrier
• VV and its extensions (incl. NB cell, 
VVPSS in case of accident)
• Blanket-, divertor- and VV-PHTS 
 Second barrier
• VVPSS & connections to the VV
• Drain tank
• PHTS-HX
• Glove boxes
• CPS, TER
• Emergency cooling system
• Isolation valve
 Second confinement system
 Third barrier
• Active systems: HVAC system, N-
VDS, TEP system, S-VDS, EDS
• Common discharge point, EV
• Tokamak and tritium building
Barriers in maintenance
 First confinement system
 First barrier
• VVPSS, drain tank
• Emergency cooling system
• Cryostat ( if vacuum is unaffected)
• CCD, transport cask (ITER) or hot 
cell (advanced concept)
 Second confinement system
 Second barrier
• HVAC system, ADS, VDS, EDS
• Common discharge point
• Tokamak building
• Crossing structure to the AMF
• AMF
Source Barrier
active passive
Energy
Decay heat Emergency cooling 
system PCCS (WCLL)
Chemical reaction 
energy
Emergency cooling 
system PCCS (WCLL)
Dust explosion N2 dilution, O2 limitation VV
Overpressure 
scenarios VVPSS, drain tank VV, EV, rupture disc
Spills of cryogenic / 
hot He into the VV - VV, EV, rupture disc
H2 explosion N2 injection VV, PAR
Radioactive 
source terms
Tritium S-VDS, EDS, isolation 
valve
VV, emergency storage 
system
Dust / ACPs Isolation valve VV
Activated materials - VV
DEMO main systems at the PBS level 1
Active system Passive system
• Magnet system (-)
• Tritium, fuelling, vacuum (TFV) (+/-)
• Tritium extraction removal (TER)
• EC system (+)
• NBI system (+)
• IC system (+)
• Plasma diagnostic & control system (+/-)
• Blanket-PHTS (+)
• VV-PHTS incl. emergency cooling 
system (+)
• DIV-PHTS (+)
• VVPSS (+)
• RM system (+)
• BOP (-)
• Cryoplant & 
cryodistribution (-)
• Electrical power supply 
systems (-)
• Plant Control System (-)
• Auxiliaries system (-)
• Radwaste treatment (+)
• VV (+)
• Divertor (-) 
• BB system (-) (HCPB,
HCLL, DCLL, WCLL)
• Limiter (-)
• Cryostat (-)
• Thermal shields (-)
• Buildings (tokamak & 
tritium buildings) (+)
• Radwaste storage (+)
(+) with confinement function, (-) no confinement function.
